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 E X E C U T I V E  S U M M A R Y  
 
here is an increasingly pervasive view among corporate governance 
observers that senior managers are too focused on short-term results at the 
expense of long-term interests.  Concerns about “short-termism” have been 
expressed within the financial industry context and outside of it, but because of 
the recent financial crisis, much of the discussion has been directed at financial 
institutions.  To combat short-termism, several commentators have advocated 
executive compensation reform to encourage senior managers to adopt a longer-
term perspective.  Yet these reforms will likely prove ineffective because of other 
significant pressures on managers to maintain current stock prices. 
 
Short-Termism Generally  
Short-termism is the tendency of public companies to overweight short-
term results relative to long-term consequences when making decisions.   Most 
critics of short-termism point to managers’ intense focus on current share prices 
as clear evidence of the phenomenon.  If capital markets were perfectly efficient, 
current share prices would incorporate predictions of long-term performance, 
which would mean that short-termist strategies would reduce, rather than 
increase, current stock prices. Nevertheless, a significant finance literature 
suggests that equity markets overweight short-term benefits and costs and 
underweight long-term ones, causing managers to prefer some suboptimal 
strategies.    
Short-termism can impose significant social costs.  It could lead to 
excessively risky behavior.  In fact, some have attributed the recent financial 
crisis to short-termism.  Under this view, financial institutions that originated, 
packaged, sold, and invested in mortgage-backed securities effectively received 
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premiums to insure against a collapse of the housing market, which was viewed 
as an extremely unlikely event that would occur in the distant future, if ever.   
These premiums boosted current earnings, which in turn boosted current stock 
prices; meanwhile the risk that was taken on by the financial institutions was not 
fully reflected in these prices.1   While short-termism can lead to this sort of 
reckless behavior, it can also result in much more mundane though still 
problematic practices.    For example, a company could reduce research and 
development expenses to ensure that it satisfies current earnings expectations, 
even if that strategy would be unprofitable over the long term.   
Short-termism is generally attributed to two causes.  First, short-termism 
could be the result of myopic shareholder preferences for current results, which 
leads to systemic over-discounting of long-term opportunities and costs.  This 
would stem principally from information asymmetry between investors and 
management and the peculiar nature of modern shareholders.   Because investors 
cannot easily assess the long-term consequences of decisions, they might tend to 
focus unduly on short-term consequences, which are far easier to assess.2  
Similarly, investors who are unable to gauge whether current earnings 
disappointments are the result of “investments in the future” or merely 
managerial incompetence may simply assume the latter.3  On this view, these 
myopic shareholder preferences would manifest themselves in pressure placed 
on boards and managers to make decisions that increase current share prices.   
Second, short-termism could be the result of poorly designed executive 
compensation arrangements.  Under this view, stock options and restricted stock 
that can be liquidated in short order unduly focus managerial attention on near-
term performance at the expense of long-term results.  Short-termism would 
therefore be a peculiar species of the traditional agency costs stemming from the 
separation of ownership and control of public companies.4 
                                                 
1 In addition to the excessive discounting of long-term consequences, this failure also may have reflected the 
sheer complexity of many of the financial products that effectively bet against a significant collapse of the 
housing market.   
2 See Judith F. Samuelson & Lynn A. Stout, Are Executives Paid Too Much?, Wall St. J., Feb. 26, 2009, at A13 (“It 
is extremely difficult for an outside investor to gauge whether a company is making sound, long-term 
investments by training employees, improving customer service, or developing promising new products.  By 
comparison, it’s easy to see whether the stock price went up today.  As a result, institutional and individual 
investors alike became preoccupied with quarterly earnings forecasts and short-term share price changes, and 
were quick to challenge the management of any bank or corporation that failed to ‘maximize shareholder 
value.’”) 
3 Another factor might be the nature of modern shareholders.  The vast majority of equity in public companies 
is now held by institutional shareholders, who are plagued by their own agency problems,  see Ronald J. Gilson 
& Jeffrey N. Gordon, Capital Markets, Efficient Risk Bearing and Corporate Governance: The Agency Costs of 
Agency Capitalism (on file with authors), which may cause them to take a short-termist perspective.    
4 Some have suggested that short-termism might be attributed to a third cause:  managerial myopia. See David 
I. Walker, The Challenge of Improving the Long-Term Focus of Executive Pay, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 435, 441-42 
(2010).  However, we are skeptical of this account. For short-termism to stem from managerial myopia, either 
managers would have to be pervasively misreading the market’s preferences (i.e., by overestimating the extent 
or intensity of shareholder short-termism) or managers would have to have a shorter investment horizon than 
the average shareholder.    As we discuss below, market mechanisms are, more than ever before, ruthlessly 
First, short-termism 
could be the result 
of myopic 
shareholder 
preferences for 
current results... 
Second, short-
termism could be 
the result of poorly 
designed executive 
compensation 
arrangements.   
 Can Executive Compensation Reform Cure Short-Termisim? 
3 
Proposals to Redesign Compensation Structures to Combat 
Short-Termism  
In response to the recent financial crisis (which was attributed in part to 
short-termism as well as the unrelated moral hazard stemming from  
governmental  guarantees of financial firms’ debt), a variety of commentators 
have proposed executive compensation reforms.  While they differ in their 
specific details, they all would delay the ability of senior management to 
liquidate equity positions for relatively long periods of time.  This would 
lengthen a manager’s investment horizon, which in turn would discourage the 
manager from making short-termist decisions.  For example, Judge Richard 
Posner has suggested that public companies be required to pay their CEOs “a 
specified percentage of his compensation in the form of restricted stock in the 
corporation—stock that he could not sell for a specified number of years.”5  
Likewise, Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried have suggested detailed 
principles for senior management compensation, all of which would 
substantially extend the investment horizon of managers by delaying their ability 
to cash out their equity holdings through sales or hedging transactions.6  Judith 
Samuelson and Professor Lynn Stout similarly would require that top executives 
hold “a significant portion of their equity for a period beyond their tenure” and 
would prohibit hedging downside risk during that period.7  Finally, Professors 
Sanjai Bhagat and Roberta Romano would generally prohibit the liquidation of 
options or restricted stock until at least two to four years after the executive’s 
tenure.8  While Bhagat’s and Romano’s  proposal was targeted mainly at those 
financial firms who received government assistance following the financial crisis 
and would  require that only these firms adopt it, they also recommend that all 
firms, financial or otherwise, consider voluntarily adopting it. 
Some policymakers have also warmed to the general idea.   In 2009, 
Andrew Cuomo, then New York State Attorney General (and now governor), 
and Congressman Barney Frank discussed compensation reforms to address 
short-termism.  Cuomo was reportedly interested in “examining ways to further 
stagger both cash and stock compensation payments over several years[, so 
                                                                                                                                     
effective in focusing managerial attention on shareholder preferences.  It therefore would be hard to believe that 
managers are so badly misreading these preferences when their jobs literally depend on them.  And, because 
shareholders of public companies can easily and quickly exit their investments, it is difficult to conceive of 
many situations where a manager’s investment horizon will be shorter than that of a shareholder.  Regardless, 
proponents of compensation reform to cure short-termism do not appear to focus on managerial myopia as a 
principal cause of the problem.   
5 Richard A. Posner, Are American CEOs Overpaid, and, If So, What If Anything Should Be Done About It?, 58 
Duke L.J. 1013 (2009). 
6 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Paying for Long-Term Performance, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1915 (2010).    
7 See Samuelson & Stout, supra note 2. 
8 Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing and Committing to the Long-
term, 26 Yale J. on Reg. 359 (2009). 
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that]… if a business built on short-term risk-taking blows up, firms will be able 
to claw back pay.”9     
 
Questioning the Effectiveness of the Compensation Proposals  
While compensation reform to address short-termism is a fairly new idea, 
executive compensation reform more generally has been in vogue for the past 
thirty or so years.  In the 1980s, compensation experts began to argue that, absent 
large amounts of incentive compensation, managers would systematically fail to 
maximize shareholder wealth.  Without proper compensation incentives, 
managers were expected to shirk their responsibilities to shareholders by giving 
insufficient effort, making inefficient decisions, engaging in entrenchment 
strategies, or self-dealing.  One particular concern was that managers would 
cause their firms to take too little risk relative to shareholder desires because 
managers were less diversified than shareholders.  These concerns drove 
compensation reformers to argue that larger and larger amounts of incentive 
pay, such as stock options, restricted stock, and performance-based bonuses, 
were essential for maximizing shareholder wealth.  The arguments for greater 
incentive pay have dominated the discussion of executive compensation up to 
today, with the mantra of “pay for performance” repeated over and over again in 
academic papers, the popular press, shareholder voting guidelines, and political 
discourse.  And this emphasis has had tangible effects—compensation packages 
of top management have changed drastically in the past thirty years to include 
increasingly large amounts of incentive pay.  In fact, it is almost universally 
recognized that the exponential increase in overall CEO pay over that period has 
been fueled by the emphasis on incentive pay. 
However, over the same 30-year period, other corporate governance 
mechanisms have developed to do much the same work as these compensation 
reforms.    We recently argued that compensation reformers have neglected to 
fully appreciate the evolution of these mechanisms, which we contend have 
developed to the point where incentive pay’s agency-cost-reducing effects may 
now be largely redundant.10  We believe that these same mechanisms will make 
compensation reforms designed to mitigate short-termism largely ineffective.    
 
The New Corporate Governance World  
Over the past 30 years, shareholders have grown far more powerful.  
Increasing proportions of shares have been held by institutional shareholders, 
and institutions that were historically reluctant to participate in shareholder 
                                                 
9 Susanne Craig, Cuomo, Frank Seek to Link Executive Pay, Performance, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 2009, at C1. 
10 See generally Andrew Lund & Gregg D. Polsky, The Diminishing Returns of Incentive Pay in Executive 
Compensation Contracts, 87 Notre Dame L. Rev. 677 (2011). 
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activism have become much more comfortable doing so.11  Likewise, modern 
shareholders make far greater use of proxy advisory firms, which allows for 
easier monitoring and coordination of shareholder pressure.  Technological 
advances have also reduced the costs of shareholder activism.  Majority voting 
and proxy access have become ascendant, and Say on Pay voting (though non-
binding) is now required by law.  Not surprisingly, the end result of these 
developments is that management has become significantly more attentive to 
shareholders’ desires. 
As shareholders have gained power, boards have naturally responded.  
Boards have become much more independent, and corporate governance 
committees are now nearly universal, while succession committees are much 
more common.  Board committees meet more often, and boards are more likely 
to have formalized the CEO evaluation process and separated the CEO and 
Chairman positions.  As a result of these developments, Professors Marcel Kahan 
and Edward Rock recently concluded that “[r]ather than help[ing] the corporate 
insider with managing the business of the corporation, boards are now 
increasingly engaged in monitoring management and planning for management 
changes.” 12    
 
Changes to Senior Management Job Security   
These developments have affected senior managers’ level of job security.   
In fact, executives of public firms are now more likely than ever to get fired for 
perceived poor performance.  This newfound risk of termination has focused 
managerial attention on shareholder preferences, namely the maintenance of 
current share prices by meeting earnings expectations, regardless of long-term 
consequences.  
Recent empirical studies suggest that for current CEOs the risk of 
termination is both significant and increasing over time.  Professors Steven 
Kaplan and Bernadette Minton found that, from 1998 through 2005, CEOs from a 
sample of large companies experienced a 17.4% annual turnover rate, which 
translates into an average CEO tenure of less than six years.13  This is consistent 
with a 2010 Wall Street Journal study, which found that the typical CEO of an 
S&P 500 firm had served in that capacity for only 6.6 years.14  This turnover rate 
is much higher than the rate that had been observed in earlier periods. 
Furthermore, as one might expect, CEO turnover is significantly related 
to share price performance.  This is true whether you adjust the company’s share 
prices for industry performance or overall market performance.  Based on this 
                                                 
11See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 3. 
12 Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 Tex. L. Rev. 987, 1027 (2010). 
13 Steven N. Kaplan & Bernadette A. Minton, How Has CEO Turnover Changed? (Aug. 2008) (unpublished 
article), available at http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/steven.kaplan/research/km.pdf. 
14 Joann S. Lublin, CEO Tenure, Stock Gains Often Go Hand-in-Hand, WALL ST. J., July 6, 2010, at B5. 
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evidence, it appears that the only way for CEOs to have a high degree of job 
security is to maintain their company’s short-term share prices.  In fact, the 2010 
Wall Street Journal study found that there were only 28 long-serving (15 years or 
longer) CEOs in place; of those 28, only three had led firms whose stock price 
had not beaten the overall S&P index over the term of their tenure.15   
For most senior managers, this enhanced risk of termination will be very 
disconcerting.  Senior managers make large, undiversified investments of 
human, financial, and reputational capital in their firms.  While termination 
could trigger a large severance package that might offset the financial loss 
resulting from termination, severance payments would not typically offset the 
effects on human and reputational capital.  Severance package or not, one would 
expect senior managers to do everything in their power to avoid being 
terminated.  The available evidence suggests that these managers will direct all 
of their efforts towards satisfying shareholder expectations, which generally 
means maintaining their company’s short-term share prices.   
Importantly for present purposes, this is true whether a manager’s 
compensation package pushes in that same direction by linking pay to current 
share prices or in the opposite direction by de-linking pay from those share 
prices.  To satisfy the newly empowered short-termist shareholder base, senior 
managers will typically be compelled by career concerns to engage in strategies 
that prop up current share prices.  If they do not, they risk lagging behind their 
competitors, thereby increasing their risk of termination.  Once one firm 
sacrifices the future to boost current earnings, executives at other firms will be 
compelled to follow suit lest their share price and, correspondingly, their career 
prospects suffer.  This, we think, is the best explanation for Chuck Prince’s 
infamous explanation of big banks’ behavior in the run-up to the recent crisis: “as 
long as the music is playing, you've got to get up and dance.” 
Whether the disciplinary action is quick and intense as in a termination or 
more gradual through an increase in intrusive monitoring by board members, 
shareholders, or the business press, shareholder expectations clearly are 
important in executive suites.  One must search long and hard to find a CEO who 
does not care deeply about current share prices.  It therefore seems naive to 
believe that managerial obsession with short-term share prices will be mitigated 
simply by restructuring compensation arrangements.  For better or for worse, 
current share price is the metric by which CEOs are judged by shareholders and 
the public, just as NFL coaches are evaluated based on current wins and losses.   
Longtime Wall Street Journal journalist Holman Jenkins has made the same 
observation.  In discussing the phenomenon of too-big-to-fail financial 
institutions that took on too much risk, Jenkins astutely predicted that 
commentators would propose compensation reform but was highly skeptical of 
this solution:  “[L]et’s not doubt that somebody somewhere is already polishing 
                                                 
15 Id. 
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up a proposal to solve the problem by regulating CEO pay.  Such faith is 
touching, though it overlooks a hard reality:  The stock market would continue to 
assert its influence over managements.”16 
 
Better Options to Mitigate Short-Termism? 
Regardless of how their compensation is structured, senior managers will 
continue to take actions to satisfy shareholder demands, for better or for worse, 
because their jobs depend on it.  Therefore, we believe that compensation reform 
to mitigate short-termism is destined to fail.  That much is easy for us to 
conclude.  The much more difficult question is:  what would work to combat 
short-termism?   The question has bedeviled others for a long time now.  Because 
our principal endeavor in this paper is to rebut the claim that executive 
compensation reform can cure short-termism, we only briefly and tentatively 
discuss some potentially better solutions.   
Responses to short-termism must focus on the enormous pressure 
brought to bear on boards and executives by capital markets.  Reformers can try 
to change either market preferences or firms’ sensitivities to the pressures 
created by those preferences.  Executive compensation reform is an ineffective 
version of the latter, as it seeks to change the sensitivities of executives within the 
firm to short-term share prices.  In an earlier paper for this series, Professor Larry 
Mitchell took a stab at changing market preferences, proposing a sliding scale 
capital gains tax rate structure, which would tax shorter-term gains at a higher 
rate than longer-term gains.17  While this proposal is intriguing because it is 
targeted at the empowered shareholder group, we worry about its effectiveness 
in practice.  U.S. tax law has long struggled with tax-deferral strategies that allow 
taxpayers to hold on to appreciated securities while hedging out future risk and 
reward.  Section 1259 of the Internal Revenue Code was enacted to treat perfect 
or near-perfect hedges as constructive sales, which trigger the capital gains tax.  
But this provision still leaves room for taxpayers to avoid the capital gains tax by 
engaging in hedging strategies that are not quite perfect enough to trigger a 
constructive sale.  Mitchell’s proposal would create even greater incentives to 
navigate around the constructive sale rules.  It is not clear to us whether a tax on 
shorter-term gains could be both high enough to alter short-termist preferences 
and low enough to discourage end-runs around the tax.18   
                                                 
16 Holman Jenkins, Bank CEOs and the Bewitching Carrot, WALL ST. J., July 14, 2010, at A17. 
17 Lawrence E. Mitchell, Whose Capital; What Gains?: Why the U.S. Economy Needs to Change Incentives, 
available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2012/07/10-corporate-purpose-mitchell. 
18 If the tax was low enough, the transaction costs in implementing a hedging strategy that successfully 
navigated the constructive sales rules could exceed the tax, in which case the taxpayer would not hedge. But if 
the tax was that low, it likely would not deter short-termist behavior in the first place.  Another concern relates 
to the fact that many of the shares of public companies are held (directly or indirectly) by tax-exempt investors, 
such as public pension funds, who because of their own agency problems, tend to have a very short-term 
perspective.   A sliding capital gains rate would have no effect on these investors’ preferences; therefore, in light 
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Reforming disclosure rules may be a better option in combating short-
termism.  Disclosure reform is interesting because arguments can be made in 
favor of both increased and decreased disclosure.  If the gap between current 
share prices and long-term prospects is the result of information asymmetry, 
perhaps the gap might be reduced through greater disclosure, especially about 
the expected long-term consequences of current decisions.  However, it is 
somewhat difficult to see how managers can credibly indicate long-term 
projections to the market when anti-fraud enforcement will have a necessarily 
weaker bite in policing soft, forward-looking information. 
Counter-intuitively, reduced disclosure might actually be worth 
considering.  Private firms are more insulated from the short-term pressures 
imposed by the capital markets.  This, for instance, was a popular explanation for 
Mark Zuckerberg’s ultimately unsuccessful attempt to keep Facebook from 
becoming a public company.  Allowing more firms to remain private, while still 
providing them with reasonable access to capital, might permit these firms to 
focus on the long term without interference by short-termist public shareholders.  
The recent JOBS Act nodded in this direction by increasing the limit on the 
number of shareholders firms could have without becoming public.  Allowing 
more firms to remain private would present significant capital allocation and 
investor protection issues, so obviously there is more to think about in deciding 
where to draw the line between public and private firms. But greater freedom for 
managers to take the long-term view by insulating them from stock market 
pressure may be a worthy consideration.    
The quandary between more versus less disclosure is a microcosm of the 
problems facing reformers and speaks to a broader point.  Short-termist behavior 
by public firms is a predictable downside of the general move toward increased 
accountability for boards and executives to public shareholders.  The corporate 
governance regime in the U.S. has generally opted for a low-friction system that 
deals with the principal-agent problem by emphasizing responsiveness to short-
term equity prices.  It stands to reason that, if we are interested in reducing the 
resulting short-termism, we might have to accept an increase in agency costs 
occasioned by throwing sand in the gears.  It is one thing to abhor short-termism.  
It is another to prefer the alternative, and advocates need to be clear about the 
trade-offs before setting out on the path towards reform.   
  
                                                                                                                                     
of their substantial shareholdings, the Mitchell proposal might not be effective, even leaving aside the 
circumvention problem.     
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